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Towns, like other corporations, have no powers except such as are expressly or
impliedly granted to them by the legislative power of the state.
In the absence of authority so conferred, a town has no power to appropriate
money for gratuities to men drafted for the military service of the United States.
But the legislature has power to authorize a town to confirm such action by
another vote on the subject, and such confirmatory action of the town will be va!id.
The power of the legislature is limited only by the constitutions of the state and
of the United States and by the principles of natural justice.
The provision of the constitution of the state against taking private property for
public use without compensation, has no application to the taking of property by
taxation. The latter takes money from individuals as their share of a justly
imposed and apportioned public burden, and an equivalent is presumptively
received in the benefits conferred by the government; the former takes property
from an individual as something distinct from and more than his share of the
general burden, and therefore the justice and necessity of special compensation.
It is not contrary to natural justice that all the inhabitants of the state should
be taxed for gratuities to a part of their number who are called upon to render
military service to the General Government.
So far from this there is an obvious equity in the burden being shared by all.
Every citizen is bound to take up arms in defence of his government if necessary,
and the selection of a class only, of a certain age, is arbitrary, and based solely
upon considerations of expediency.
Although the state, as such, is under no obligation to aid the General Government in raising an army for national defence, yet the general good of the people
of the state is involved in the maintenance of the General Government, and the
legislature may properly act for the promotion of this general good.
If the legislature could not tax the people for a gratuity where no possible public
benefit would be produced, the case must yet be one of an extraordinary character
to justify the interference of the judiciary.
If there be the least possibility that making the gift will be promotive in any
degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy and not of natural
justice, and the determination of the legislature is conclusive.

PETITION for an injunction.

The petition alleged that the legal voters of the town of Woodbury held a special town meeting, on the 13th of August 1863,
at which the following votes were passed.
" Whereas, under the law of Congress passed March 3d 1863.
known as the Conscription Law, and under the call of the
President of the United States, the apportionment thereunder

of the town of Woodbury is supposed to be thirty-two men, to
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be drafted from among the citizens of this town liable to do
military duty:" Therefore, Resolved, That the sum of six thousand four
hundred dollars, or so much of said sum as may be necessary,
be and the same is hereby appropriated from the treasury of
this town for the following purposes, viz., two hundred dollars
thereof to be paid into the hands of a committee to bb appointed
for that purpose, for the benefit of each person drafted from this
town who shall not be exempt under any of the provisions of said
law, and who shall be liable to answer to the said draft under any
of the provisions of said law ; said committee to procure substitutes for each and all such drafted men whenever each one so
drafted shall furnish to said committee the amount in cash over
and above the two hundred dollars necessary to procure a substitute, not exceeding three hundred dollars in the whole :-Provided,
if substitutes cannot be had by said committee for a sum not
exceeding three hundred dollars each, then in that case said committee pay over said two hundred dollars furnished by the town to
each of such drafted men that is mustered into the service of the
United States himself, and also to any one who does not refuse to
accept a substitute when to be had for a sum not exceeding t1iree
hundred dollars.
"RBesolved, That the selectmen of the town be and they are
hereby authorized to borrow. the said sum of six thousand four
hundred dollars, or such part thereof as shall from time to time
be necessary, and make their orders on the town therefor ; and
the selectmen are hereby appointed to disburse such money or such
part thereof to said committee as shall be necessary to carry out
the foregoing resolution."
Other votes passed, including one appointing the committee, are
omitted.
The petitioners averred that said votes were illegal, unjust to
the tax-payers, unconstitutional, and disloyal to the government
of the United States; that they were intended to defeat the proper
effect of the law of the United States, and the call of the President
for three hundred thousand drafted men to fill the armies of the
United States; and that the town thereby unlawfully undertook
to transfer the individual liability of each person drafted by the
United States, to widows, orphans, and non-military subjects, as
well as to those liable in their own persons to do military duty in
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behalf of the United States. They also averred that they were
inhabitants and tax-payers of the town and had a direct interest
in said votes, and that their property was liable to be taken for the
tax made necessary thereby, and that the selectmen of the town,
the committee appointed, and the treasurer of the town, were
endeavoring to raise said sum of six thousand four hundred dollars,
and threatened to raise it if possible, and to issue town notes,
orders, or other evidences of indebtedness against the town to
secure the same, to be paid ultimately by tax out of the property
of the tax-payers of the town. They therefore prayed for an
injunction against the town and the officers named, forbidding
them to borrow or otherwise raise said money or any part of it, or
to pay it out or any part of it in the manner directed by the vot.L
of the town.
The respondents made the following answer :-" That i pursuance of a statute passed at the special session of the legislature
in November 1863, said town of Woodbury, at a legal meeting
duly called and held on the 18th day of January 1864, passed
the following vote, to wit :--' Voted to confirm the votes and
resolutions passed at a special town meeting on the 13th day of
August, 1863, and recorded on the records of this town in the
town clerk's office.'
The respondents therefore pray that the
petitioners take nothing by their motion and that the same be dismissed."
The petitioners demurred to the answer, and the case was
reserved for the advice of this court.
Cothren, for the petitioners.-1. Towns have no inherent power
or right to tax their inhabitants to sustain either the State or National
Government. They have only the rights conferred by their charters:
Willard v. Borough of Killingworth, 8 Conn.- 254.; Higley v.
Bunce, 10 Id. 442; City of New London v. Brainard,22 Id.
552; Abendroth v. Town of Greenwich, 29 Id., 356, 362;
Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 278, 282; Hodges v. City
of Buffalo, 2 Denio 110. It is the duty of the National Government to protect and defend not only the towns from the casualties
of war but also the several states. It is not the duty of the
towns to defend either the state or the nation. Even a state has
no power to tax its inhabitants to defend itself or the nation. The
Constitution vests the whole power of declaring and carrying on
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war, either offensive or defensive, in the General Government. The
United States calls under the war power for a contribution from
the able-bodied men within certain ages to fill its armies, and pays
the persons who serve. It is wholly a national matter.
2. The liability to military service in defence of the country is
wholly a personal liability, and a duty owed by such as re
military subjects of the United States. This liability cannot be
transferred to any other person or persons; especially it cannot
be transferred by taxation or otherwise to widows, orphans, children,
and non-military subjects.
3. The legislature, either before or after such town actioi, has
no power to authorize the towns to pass votes taxing citizens to
pay for the individual liability of citizens owing service to the
United States: Toodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 169 ; Goshen
v. Stonington, 4 Id. 225; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend.
148, 151 ; Matter of John Street, 19 Id. 676; -Dash v. Vran
K/eeck, 7 Johns. 504; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 144;
Opinion of Judges of Supreme Court of Maine, Am. Law Reg.,
Aug. 1863, p. 621; Hillam v. .Killam,Am. Law Reg., Nov.
1861,p. 18. The legislature has no power to take private property
for private use. It does not even have the power to take private
property for public use without just compensation. But the new
act allows towns to take by taxation private property to pay
private liabilities imposed by the United States, -without any compensation. Suppose the town should pass a vote dividing the
property of the inhabitants equally among all the citizens of the
town. Such a vote would of course be illegal and wholly void.
Could the legislature authorize towns to make such action legal
by a subsequent vote ratifying the former one ? Such action of
the legislature, whether by giving power to towns in the first
instance, or by confirming their void acts after they are past, is
itself utterly void, because beyond the constitutional power of the
legislature, and contrary to the general principles of legislation.
. IF. Seymour and HYuntington, for the respondents.
1. The votes of the town were legal at the time they were
passed and before they were confirmed under the statute passed
in November 1863, "authorizing towns to hold town meetings for
purposes therein specified." By 6ur statute it is made the duty
of towns to make such "orders, rules, and regulations for their
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welfare as they may deem expedient," and to grant annual taxes
" sufficient to defray all lawful and necessary expenses incurred
by them :" Rev. Stat., tit. 8, §§ 29, 3L. It was for the common
benefit of the inhabitants of Woodbury that the town quota should
be filled, and that common benefit justifies a general taxation.
The common welfare of the town might demand that substitutes
should be hired for drafted men, who would serve the government
equally well, and leave good farmers and good mechanics at their
labor. The town could better afford to pay the money than lose
the men, and the government is in either case equally assisted.
The same argument holds good in reference to the three hundred
dollar commutation fee. But the right of towns in Connecticut
to. appropriate money from their treasuries, and lay taxes to pay
bounties in furtherance of the necessities of the General Government in time of war, is not urged now for the first time. It was
a right constantly exercised up to the establishment of our state
constitution: 1 Hollister's History of Conn. 88; 2 Id. 147;
Cothren's History of Woodbury 188 ; 2 Kent Com. (4th ed.) 274 ;
1 DeTocqueville's Democracy in America, 40. It is a right
judicially recognised: Hitchcock v. Litchfield, 1 Root 206.
The constitution of this state is a limitation of powers: Starr v.
Pease, 8 Conn. 547. It has never limited the power of towns
in this particular. By the terms of the constitution itself, all
rights that corporations had previous to its establishment, are
expressly guaranteed, save as expressly restricted by that instrument: Constitution, art. 10, sec. 3. The case of New London
v. Brainard,22 Conn. 552, differs in all the above particulars
from the case at bar.
2. If there was no power in the town to pass the vote in question, the Act of the Legislature and the subsequent confirming
vote of the town have put it in a position to legally tax its
inhabitants to carry out the provisions of the vote. That act is
opposed to no provision of the state or national constitutions. It
can only be adjudged invalid on the ground that it is opposed to
natural right and justice: Welch v. Wadsworth, 80 Conn. 149.
That it is not so opposed the sense of the community, as evidenced
by the boun y votes so generally passed by towns, by the almost
unanimous vote of the legislature, and the confirmatory votes of
the towns, clearly shows. Is it in opposition to natural right and
justice that property, three-quarters of which is probably in the
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hands of persons not liable to a draft, should bear its fair share
of the burden of the present exigency ? Those over forty-five
years of age have an equal interest in the stability of our institutions. The drafted man pays his share of all taxes, and in
addition, whichever of the legal alternatives he chooses, service,
either personal, by substitute, or the commutation. Is it unjust
that this extra burden should be assumed by all, and the entire
community be permitted to pay what the great majority esteem it
a privilege to pay ? It is not taxing A. to put money into the pocket
of B. ; it is taxing all to meet the requirements of a peremptory law.
Nor is it true, as was contended below, that because a duty is
imposed upon one individual, therefore it is illegal to tax another
to help pay for the performance of such duty. It is the duty of
parents to educate their children by the statute ; yet a person having
no children pays an annual school tax to help educate the children
of parents of abundant means. So also taxes are annually laid
to support paupers who have relatives legally bound to support
them. The right of the legislature to pass confirmatory and
retrospective acts cannot be questioned : Goshen v. Stonington,
4 Conn. 209 ; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Id. 149. The legislature
may confirm the doings of towns upon condition that they shall
re-pass their former vote, and may legalize a tax laid after such
confirmatory vote. This is no delegation of legislative power to
the town, but only the condition upon which a legislative act shall
be applicable to a given case. The legislature gives to cities the
right to lay taxes for improvements, for instance, upon a majority
vote of the legal voters. The vote of the 6itizens does not give the
right to tax, but is the means of availing themselves of the right.
The arguments against the power of towns to grant bounties
under this act may be urged with equal force against the right
of the state to exercise the ame power.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BUTLELR, J.-"
Towns, like other corporations, can exercise no
powers except such as are expressly granted to them, or such as
are necessary to enable them to discharge their duties, and carry
into effect the objects and purposes of their creation :" Abendroth
v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 363. "They act not by any inherent
right of legislation, like the legislation of the state, but their
authority is delegated :" DAGGETT, J., in Willard v. Borough
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of Killngworth, 8 Conn., 254. Such is the law as repeatedly
recognised by this court, and it is quite too late to urge for them
the possession of any inherent or prescriptive rights or powers, or any rights or powers not expressly or impliedly delegated to them
by the legislative power of the state.
When, in August 1863, the town of Woodbury passed the vote
complained of, they attempted the exercise of a power which had
never been so conferred upon them, and their proceedings were
void. But by the Act of November 13th 1863, they were
authorized by the legislature to ratify and confirm those proceedings, and they did so ratify them, as the demurrer to the respondents' answer admits. That authority and ratification must
dispose of this case if it was competent for the legislature to
authorize their confirmation.
The votes complained of appropriated six thousand. dollars to
be divided among the men who should be drafted to fill the quota
of that town, authorized by a law of the United States, and called
for by the President, and for the purpose of assisting the citizens
so drafted to obtain substitutes, or as a bounty if they personally
answered the draft and served ; and the votes further provided
for raising the money by borrowing. This action involved an
ultimate tax upon all the inhabitants of the town, for the purpose
of conferring a gratuity upon those who, by the law of the land,
owed military service to the United States and were called on to
render it, and because to render it was deemed a hardship upon
those upon whom the draft had fallen or should fall; and that tax
must presumptively fall upon some who were not subjects of
military duty under existing laws, or liable to be made such
under any reasonable and just law which Congress have power to
enact. Was it competent for the legislature to authorize the
ratification of such action by the towi ?
This question seems to be involved in another and higher one,
viz., whether it is competent for the state legislature to give
gratuities to such of our citizens as are called, under the allegiance they owe to the National Government, and independent of the
allegiance they owe to the state government, by distinctive and
independent national enactments, to render to that National Government distinct and independent military service, and tax the citizens
generally therefor. For, if they have the power to do it, they
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may apportion and impose the duty or confer the power of doing
it upon the tQwns.
It is clear that with such action of the general government the
state government, as such, has legitimately nothing to do. In
authorizing, under the power to raise armies, a national conscription by the National Government, the constitution so far forth
ignores the state governments entirely; although it is otherwise
in respect to the militia, for in regard to their organization and
use, by another and distinct clause of the Constitution and the
laws of Congress enacted under and by virtue of it, the National
Government and the state governments act together concurrently
or in harmony. It is clear therefore that the state government,
as such, is under no obligation to aid the general government
in such an exercise of its powers, and if it attempts to aid it
is wholly a volunteer. By what principle then can the legislative
branch of the state government be justified in taxing the people
of the state, or authorizing their taxation by towns, to confer
gratuities upon persons drafted by the United States.
Not by force of any specific authority conferred by the state
constitution. That instrument does not confer any such power
specifically. It provides for a collective body of persons, in whom
the legislative power of the state shall vest, and by whom that
legislative power shall be exercised, as an elective General
Assembly, and confers upon them the whole legislative power as
inherent in the people, except impliedly such as had been granted
to Congress by the Constitution of the United States and such as
the General Assembly are expressly restrained from exercising
by the bill of rights.
The question in hand therefore comes to this :-1st. Had the
people of this state when they adopted the present constitution of
the state, the inherent right, as part of the legislative power, to
appropriate the money of all, as a gratuity to the few who should
be called at any time by the National Government into its independent service ; and 2d. If they had such power, have they restrained
the General Assembly from exercising it by any of the limitations
of the constitution.
It must be conceded that the people, if convened and organ.
ized as a whole, and acting upon, the fundamental principle that
what the majority prescribe shall be law, could be under no
restraint except that imposed by the principles of natural justice;
VOL. xI.-14
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and the General Assembly in the exercise of that conferred legis.
lative power, and irrespective of the Bill of Rights, are restrained
by the same principles and no other. The first question, therefore, may be further narrowed to the inquiry, whether it is con
trary to natural justice that A and B and the rest of the
inhabitants of the state, should be taxed for gratuities to C and D,
when C and _D are called upon to render military service to the
general government. It should be observed that the bounty contemplated in the case put, as in this, differs from the bounty given
by the United States, for that is in part payment for the service.
It differs also from any bounty given to the militia in case they
are turned over and mustered into the service of the United
States, for the organization and support of the militia is the con
current duty of both governments. It differs also from the case
cited fr-om Root (Hitchcock v. -Litchfield,1 Root 206i) for there
the troops were raised by the state and the state apportioned and
imposed the duty upon the towns. It differs also from a case of
bounty to volunteers raised by the state and turned over to the
service of the United States, for in this instance, although the
call was apportioned by the general government, for purposes of
equality, among the states, districts and towns, it was apportioned
and imposed directly upon the people as individuals, and not upon
the states, districts and towns. The case is therefore entirely
new, and the question returns, could the people as a whole, if they
had retained the whole legislative power, by a major vote, tax A
and B and the rest, to give a gratuity to C and 1, because C'and
D were drafted by the United States ; and if an infringement of
the principles of natural justice, is it such an infringement that
it is our duty to hold the law inoperative ? Yery clearly such a
vote would not be such an infringement, for several reasons.
In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for
the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or
of a sum of money to be raised by taxation, where no possible
public benefit, direct or indirect, can be derived therefrom, such
exercise of the legislative power must be of an extraordinary
character to justify the interference of the judiciary; and this is
not that case.
Second, if there be the least possibility that making the gift
will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes
a question of policy and not of natural justice; and the determi-
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nation of the legislature is conclusive. And such is this case.
Such gifts to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind,
the deaf and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or
schools, or grants of pensions, swords, or other mementoes for
past services, involving the general good indirectly and in slight
degree, are frequently made and never questioned.
Third, the government of the United States was constituted by
the people of the state, although acting in concert with the people
of other states, and the general good of the people of this state is
involved in the maintenance of that general government. In many
conceivable ways the action of the town of Woodbury might not
only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the
service of that class more efficient to the General Government, and
therefore it must be presumed that the legislature found that the
public good was in fact thereby promoted.
And fourth, it is obviously possible, and therefore to be intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to justify
their action.
Every citizen is bound to take up arms when necessary in
dofence of his government, not as a matter of strict law, but as
an incident of citizenship; and the selection of a class only, of a
certain age, of whom that service is to be immediately demanded
in a particular case, although wise, is arbitrary, not based on any
peculiar or special obligation resting upon the class, or on their
ability alone to render the service or to render it with less pecuniary or social sacrifice, but on the wants of the government and
the supposed fitness of the class to subserve the purposes of the
government with more efficiency than others. But if all owe th6
service, and it is for the common good, and there is the usual pro-'
vision that it may be rendered by substitute or commutation, it is
not easy to see why men above forty-five years of age if able
bodied may not be called upon as well as those of less age. If
not as able to endure the hardships of the field, they may answer
equally well for garrison-duty or as details, and presumptively
they are better able to procure substitutes or commute, for they
have more generally accumulated property or received it by
inheritance. Indeed if substitution and commutation are made
elements of the conscription, and they were of the law in question,
the ability to procure a substitute or commute may well be an
element without regard to age, and therefore when all above a
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certain age are exempt they are favored ; and it is clearly equitable and just that they equalize the burden by bounties to those
who are drafted and serve or by making provision for the support
of their families. On this obvious equity rests the general law
making provision for the families of all drafted men and their
*substitutes.
As, therefore, if the people of the state collectively had retained
all that portion of their legislative power not delegated to the
Congress of the United States, it would have been competent for
them to pass votes in reference to all the drafted men of the state
like those which the respondent town passed, and as they have
delegated their whole remaining legislative power to the General
Assembly with certain exceptions contained in the bill of right3,
it was competent for the General Assembly to do so, and therefore
it was competent for them to delegate that power to .territorial
districts of the state or towns, and of course to authorize the
towns to ratify votes of that character which they had passed
without seeking beforehand such delegation of authority, unless
the Assembly are restrained from the exercise of that power by
some clause in the bill of rights contained in the constitution.
And this leads to the second question, viz., whether there is any
such prohibition in the bill of rights.
The clause relied upon by the petitioners is that which inhibits
the " taking of private property for public use without just compensation." But it is clear that the law in question was not passed
in contravention of that clause of the constitution. The votes of
the town did not contemplate the taking of any property within
the meaning of that clause. They appropriated money as a bounty
or gratuity, and authorized the selectmen to borrow it, and the
legislature authorized them, by the Act of November 13th 1863,
to lay a tax to pay it. If it be conceded that the money must be
raised by tax, and that as a necessary consequence appropriating
the money was equivalent to laying a tax, still the action of the
legislature was not within the clause. Exacting money by taxation and taking private property for public use, are different
things. Both, it is true, are in one sense the exercise of a right
to take the property of individuals for public use, but there is
a broad distinction between them. Taxation exacts money from
individuals as their share of a justly imposed and apportioned
general public burthen, and the equivalent is presumptively
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reeeived in the benefits conferred by the government. Property
taken for public use from one or more individuals only, by right
of eminent domain, is taken not as his or their share of an apportioned public burthen, but as something distinct from and more
than his or their share of the public burthens, and therefore the
justice and necessity of a constitutional provision for compensation. The clause referred to has no bearing on the case.
The superior court must be advised to overrule the demurrer
to the answer and dismiss the bill.
The other judges concurred.
The foregoing opinion, which will appear in the 32d of Connecticut Reports,
we cannot but regard as a very clear
and satisfactory exposition of the law,
applicable to a subject of no little difficulty and importance at the present time.
The proposition that the power of the
legislature in the several states is limited
only by the restrictions contained in the
state and national eonstitutions, is one
-that we have long regarded as most unquestionably sound, and this we regard
as one of the most marked and characteristic distinctions between the proper functions of thestate andnational legislatures.
Thus, while the absolute state sovereignty is in a manner subordinate to
that of the nation, to the extent of the
very limited range of national sovereignty, it is superior to that of the nation,
in that all the dormant and undeveloped
powers of sovereignty reside in the several states, and all the legislative powers
requisite to carry these powers into
effective operation reside also in the
several state legislatures.
The proposition thus put forth, in the
principal ease, as to the unlimited extent
of the legislative functions of the several
state legislatures, declaring those powers
absolutely unlimited, as much so as those
of the British Parliament, except as they
are specifically restricted by the constitutions of the states and of the nation
respectively, is one which we cannot

regard as even doubtful, although the
contrary has often been asserted by judges
of great eminence and experience. We
cannot comprehend why the state legislatures should not popsess all powers of
a strictly legislative character which reside anywhere, either in the state or the
people, unless restrained by written limitations. And these limitations can exist
only in the state or national constitutions. This will give the nation supreme
legislative powers upon all questions
specifically delegated to the national
authority, and upon all such incidental
questions as are fairly within the compass of the powers specifically delegated.
I. The principle of limitation here
applied to the corporate powers of the
municipalities, viz., those embraced in
their charter, or act of incorporation,
with its several amendments, is the same
which applies to all corporate action.
A corporation is a mere creation of the
law, and, as such, can have no powers
except such as are either expressly or by
reasonable implication conferred by the
act of incorporation, or by subsequent
amendments, or by general legislation,
which, by construction, becomes a portion
of the act of incorporation.
III. The distinction between the taking of private property for public use by
virtue of the right of eminent domain,
where it is required that the owner shall
be compensated by receiving an equiva-
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lent in money, and the taking of private secured, is here very fully, and, as it
property for the public use by way of seems to us, very happily illustrated by
taxation, where it is presumed that the the learned judge; and it is one importowner receives an equivalent by means ant to be considered and remembered.
of the benefits of good government thus
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH TO THE USE OF BENJAMIN KELLOGG, &c., v
ALFRED C. HARMER ET AL.
The liability of a recorder of deeds on a false certificate of search only extends
to the party taking the certificate, and does not entitle a future purchaser to recover
against him.
The sureties of the recorder of deeds are not liable for false searches.

Nisi Prius, on demurrer. Opinion by
J.-The first three causes of demurrer are unimportant
as they are all amendable, but the amendments should be made.
The remaining four bring into view substantial defects. The first
to be noticed is the manner of stating the plaintiffs. Kellogg was
the person who obtained the recorder's certificate, and made the
first purchase under it. He sold to William Mullison, who afterwards sold to Anna Shott. Under the act regulating suits on
official bonds the suit is in the name of the Commonwealth, and as
many persons may be suggested plaintiffs who choose to join, but
each must declare and assign breaches for his separate injury,
Her6-,however, the pleader has suggested Kellogg as plaintiff for
use of Mullison for use of Shott. Kellogg, in this suit, is the
only plaintiff, while the others are merely persons to whom his
right of action has passed. This being the suggestion of the
plaintiff, it is plain that no injury sustained by either Mullison or
Shott can be declared upon, for in this form the last assignee
merely takes what Kellogg may recover.
In one point of view this cause is also unimportant because it is
clearly amendable by striking out the use and permitting the two
last named to come in as plaintiffs in their own behalf, the act
referred to giving the right of suggestion at any time before judgment. But this change in the relation of the parties from uses to
plaintiffs, discloses the real vice of this declaration. The only
damages averred are those arising upon the sale from Mullison to
AT

AGNEW,
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Anna Shott, who it is alleged paid $13,000 for the property upon
the faith of the false certificate of the recorder of deeds. The
declaration being amended, that is, Anna Shott being suggested
plaintiff in her own right, the question is at once presented, can
she found an action against the recorder for damages upon a
certificate of search given to Kellogg, an antecedent purchaser?
The question is important, as in this city the custom is to pass
the certificates of search of deeds, mortgages, and judgments with
the title papers, each subsequent purchaser taking the title upon
the faith of the former searches down to the date of the certificate,
and procuring new searches only for subsequent conveyances and
liens. While it is important, still I think it is not difficult of
determination. So far as the certificate is the evidence of the
state of the public record this custom is well enough. A search
once made by the officer under his official responsibility is in all
probabilities correct, and therefore may be relied upon without a
new one. It is not often these searches are incorrect, otherwise
actions upon false certificates would be more frequent; their
rarity is the evidence of official correctness and fidelity; and
therefore the certificate has all the force of evidence in the hands
of subsequent purchasers, that it had in those of the first. But
when you touch the official responsibility of the officer, you reach
a different question. It is then not simply the evidence which the
certificate affords, but the duty it involves.
What is this duty ? It is, as the keeper of the record, to make
searches for deeds and mortgages, and other recordable instruments, at the instance of those who may apply therefor and pay
him the fee, which the law allows him for the performance of the
duty. The duty is specific to make it for him who asks for it and
pays for it, and therefore has a right to the responsibility of the
officer and to rely upon it. It is he who is deceived by the officer's
false search because he alone stands in privity with him, by
demanding performance of the duty and making compensation for
it. The emoluments of the office constitute the consideration of
undertaking the responsibility. Who would accept the office and
perform such duties involving such heavy liabilities, if he were to
be allowed no equivalent ? The officer who makes a search stands,
in reference to its correctness, in the attitude of an insurer, and
his fee represents the premium. To make him responsible to
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every new purchaser without a fee would be as inequitable as to
hold an insurer liable upon a new risk without a new premium.
But when we come to analyze the transaction, we will find it
impossible to carry on the notion of continuing liability. The
injury arising from a false certificate of search, undoubtedly falls
upon the person who obtains and acts upon it; because the fact
which causes his injury, to wit, the undisclosed deed or mortgage,
precedes his purchase. It is the title he purchases which is
affected. As it is he who suffers by the unrevealed conveyance
or incumbrance, the right of action is personal to himself. It
does not run with the land, but passes to his personal representative. If he sell with covenants for title, or for quiet enjoyment,
his own liability to his vendee requires him to retain it, to make
good his own loss. If not answerable to his vendee because he
has given no covenant for title, the rule caveat emptor which protects him, also protects the officer who is responsible to him. The
action being his own he may also end it by accord and satisfaction
or by release.
Carry this further. He can recover for the injury which leads
him to accept a worthless title or an incumbered estate. This is
clear. His damage is the cost of the worthless title (the case laid
in the declaration), which is the price paid. To-morrow he sells
for twice as much; and the next day his vendee sells for three
times the first sum, which price will be the real damage. If the
first one being paid by the recorder, release him, will that satisfy
the injury, or will it be only pro tanto, leaving the second to run,
and on his payment and release, leaving the third what shall
remain? This is a sad jumble of interfering rights, growing out
of continuing liability. But it is said the recorder may take up
his certificate on payment. But this will not always protect the
subsequent purchase, which may have taken place before the discovery of the secret deed or mortgage, so that the right of action
has vested, if vest it can. A continuing liability, beginning like a
snowball, increases like an avalanche overwhelming and destroying
.the unfortunate incumbent of office. Now while he must bring
fidelity and diligence to the execution of his duties, the law owes
him protection against needless severity and hardship. It is much
less hardship to require a new search for every purchaser than to
entail upon officers the accumulated burthens of independent transactions, and adventitious advahce of the prices of real estate.
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If, instead of continuing liability, we proceed upon the ground
of successive liability to each new purchaser, the case runs counter
to the objections before stated. The officer owes but one duty,
which is to him who employs and pays him. If a new liability
arises, it is because of a new duty which cannot take place without
renewed privity and renewed compensation. It encounters a
further objection. The new duty at each successive purchase
gives rise to a new cause of action, which runs only from its
breach, and cannot occur till the new purchase is made. This
may be twenty years after the date of the certificate. But this is
repugnant to the Statute of Limitations, which bars actions against
sureties in official bonds after seven years from the injury, and
that must arise during the official term;
It cannot be the case that a right of action follows the floating
certificate down the stream of title, because there is no adequate
compensation for this tremendous risk, there is no privity of duty
between the officer and those coming after the person procuring
the search, there is a compounding of several injuries, whiere but
one can naturally exist, and because it is clearly harsh, unjust,
and impolitic.
If any one will have, in addition to the satisfactory evidence
which the certificate affords, the personal responsibility of the
officer, let him ask for it and pay for it by obtaining a new search.
There is good reason for this ; a new search may'reyeal the before
undiscovered incubus upon the title, freeing the officer from further
liability, and the applicant from injury and litigation. Give the
officer a locus, and the citizen the means of escape from undesired
difficulty.
There is an objection not contained in the griounds of demurrer
fatal to this action, if the condition of the bond be correctly set
out in the declaration. The only condition recited isto " deliver
up the records and other writings belonging to the said office,
whole, safe, and undefaced, to his successor therein, according to
law." This covers only the public interest, but provides for no
protection against private injury. The liability of the sureties is
strictly legal, and cannot be extended beyond the terms of the
condition.
Judgment for the defendant in the demurrer.
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Sales of mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure and sale are usually
made in the Federal courts by the marshal of the district wliere the decree was
entered or by a master appointed by the court, as directed in the decree.
Contracts for the purchase and sale of goods or lands at public auction are contracts founded upon mutual promises, and consequently they cannot be regarded
as perfected and binding unless they have received the consent of the parties.
Biddings at an auction are mere offers, which may be retracted at any time
before the hammer is down or until the bid has in some way been accepted by the
seller.
Auction sales under a decretal order are always regarded as under the control
of the court and subject to the power of the court to set the sale aside or open it,
if the circumstances of the case require it, before it has been confirmed.
Such sales are usually conducted under the advice of the solicitor of the complainauts ; but his instructions, if oppressive to the respondent or unreasonable,
cannot control the officer, because the officer has duties to perform to the respondent as well as to the complainant, and to the court as well as to the parties.
Every such officer possesses the power, for good cause shown, to adjourn the
sale; and, if the interests of the parties require it, he is bound to exercise a
sound discretion upon the subject.
Reasons for the adjournment in this case are satisfactory, as it was granted at
the request of the parties to the suit to enable the respondents to negotiate an
arrangement to pay the mortgage-debt.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-The respondents mortgaged their railroad to
certain trustees as a security for moneys loaned and advances of

various kinds, and to defray the current expenses of operating the,
railroad and of keeping the same in repair. Suit was brought by
the trustees and certain creditors, named in the bill of complaint,
to foreclose the mortgage for a breach of the conditions, and the
cause proceeded to a decree of foreclosure and of sale. The substance of the decree was that the mortgaged premises should be
sold, at public auction, under the direction of the marshal of the

district, unless the mortgagors should pay to the complainants,
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previous to the sale, the sum of $254,175, with interest from the
date of the decree. Pursuant to that decree the marshal, on the
6th day of June 1862, offered the mortgaged premises for sale, but
as no bids were received he adjourned the sale, under the instructions of the solicitors of the complainants, to the 19th day of the
same month, at the same hour and place.
The report of the marshal also shows that he again offered the
premises for sale at the time and place of adjournment, and that
the appellant bid for the same the sum of $250,000, which was the
highest and best bid received at that time. Fearing that the stock
would be sacrificed if the sale should be completed, the agent of
the stockholders made application to the solicitors of the complainants, requesting that the sale might be postponed for a short time
to enable the respondents to make some arrangements to pay the
mortgage-debt without a sale of the property. Yielding to that
suggestion the solicitors gave such directions, and the marshal
accordingly adjourned the sale for the period of two days, giving
notice at the time that the sale at the expiration of that period
would be again opened at the same hour and place, and that the
bid of the appellant would be regarded as pending.
Such an arrangement having been negotiated during those two
days, a further adjournment became necessary to enable the parties to carry it into effect; but when the sale was opened for that
purpose, the appellant was present and increased his bid to the
full amount of the mortgage-debt, including interest, costs, and
expenses of sale. No other bids having been made the sale was
adjourned, as directed, to the 1st day of October, and afterwards
to the 15th day of January following, but before the day to which
the last adjournment was made the respondents paid the amount of
the decree to the complainants, and the sale was discontinued.
The record also shows that the appellant applied to the court by
petition on the 9th day of October 1862, to have the sale confirmed
to him on his bid as increased to the full amount of the decree of
foreclosure and sale, but the court denied the prayer of the petition, and from that order the petitioner appealed to this court.
1. Appellant contends that inasmuch as he bid the full amount
of the decree, interest, and costs, at a time when the mortgaged
premises were duly offered for sale, and inasmuch as his bid was
the highest and best bid offered for the premises, it became and
was the duty of the marshal to have struck off the property to him
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as the legai purchaser of the same, and that the District Court
erred in denying his petition for the confirmation of the sale. On
the other hand the respondents deny that any sale was ever made,
and insist that the bid of the appellant was a mere offer of purchase, which he might withdraw at any time before the bid was
accepted or the property was struck off to him, and an entry to
that effect was made by the marshal.
2. Sales of mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure
and sale, are usually made in the Federal courts by the marshal of
the district where the decree was entered or by the master
appointed by the court, as directed in the decree. Such sales
must be made by the person designated in the decree or under his
immediate direction and supervision, but he may employ an
auctioneer to conduct the sale if it be made in his presence. The
express directions of the decree in this case were that.the mortgaged premises should be sold at public auction, unless the respondents, as mortgagors, should, previously to such sale, pay to the
complainants the amount of the mortgage-debt as specified in the
decree.
8. Contracts for the purchase and sale of goods or lands at
public auction are contracts founded upon mutual promises and a
mutuality of obligation, and consequently they cann6t be regarded
as having been perfected and made binding unless they have
received the consent of the parties. Consent of parties being
essential to the contract set up in this case, it becomes important
to ascertain in what way and to what extent guch consent must be
manifested, and to distinguish accurately between mere offers or
proposals by the one party not accepted or approved by the other,
and mutual and positive engagements which neither party can
retract or withdraw: Addison on Contracts (Ed. 1857), p. 23-154.
Unaccepted offers to enter into a contract bind neither party,
and can give rise to no cause of action; as for example, if one merchant offer to sell goods to another, such an offer is not binding
luntil it has been in some form accepted by the party to whom it
was made. Liability cannot arise in such a case, because the
party making the offer cannot be held answerable to the other for
not selling the goods, unless that other by accepting the offer has
bound himself to purchase.
4. Biddings at an auction, says 'Mr. Addison, are mere offers,
which may be retracted at any time before the hammer is
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down and the offer has been accepted: Addison on Contracts,
p. 26. The leading case upon that subject is that of Paine v.
Cave, 3 Term 148, where it was expressly held, that every bidding
at an auction is nothing more than an offer on one side until it has
received the assent of the auctioneer as the agent of the owner.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, in the case of .isher
v. Leitzer, 23 Penn. St. Rep. 308, that a bidder at a sheriff's
sale" has a right to retract his .bid before the property.is struck
down to him, and that the sheriff has no right to prescribe condi-.
tiois which will deprive him of such a right. The express ruling
was that a bid at an auction before the hammer falls is like an
offer before acceptance, and that when the bid is withdrawn before
it is accepted there is no contract, and that such a bidder cannot
be regarded in any sense as a purchaser. The rule, as laid down
in the last edition of Story on Sales, is substantially the same as
that adopted in the preceding case. Speaking of ordinary sales
at an auction, the author says that the seller may withdraw the
goods or the bidder may retract his bid at any time before they
are struck off, and the reason assigned for the rule is that so long
as the final consent of both parties is not signified by the blow of
the hammer, there is no mutual agreement to a definite proposition: 1 Sugd. on Vend. and Pur. 25. But as soon as the hammer
is struck down, says the same author, the bargain is considered as
concluded, and the seller has no right afterwards to accept a higher
bid, nor the buyer. to withdraw from the contract: _utlidge v.
Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Cookc v. Oxley, 3 Term 654; Adams v.
Tinsdell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681; Story on Sales, § 461. The same
rules prevail upon a sale under common law process as in other
cases of sales at public auction so far as respects the question now
before the court. Until the property is actually struck off to the
bidder he may withdraw his bid as a mere offer or proposition:
Crocker on Sheriffs, p. 201.
5. Judicial sales made under the decretal orders of courts of
chancery are also, in this country, governed substantially by the
same rules, except that such sales are usually made by the marshal
or a master in chancery acting as an officer of the court, and are
always regarded as under the control of the court and subject to
the power of the court to set the sale aside for good cause shown,
or to open it at any time before it has been confirmed, if the circumstances of the case require the exercise of that power.
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Doubtless such sales are usually conducted under the advice of the
solicitor of the complainant, and it is sometimes said that the
solicitor, in all questions arising between the vendor and purchaser,
must be considered as the agent of all the parties to the suit; but
it is lUelieved that the remark must be received with some qualification: Daly v. Pullen, 1 Russ. & My. 296. Suppose it to be
so, however, in a qualified sense, still it is true that the marshal
or master, as the case may be, is the officer of the court, and that
as such his acts and proceedings are subject to the revision and
control of the court: Collier v. Whipple, 13 Wend. 229. In sales
directed by a court of chancery, says Judge SToRY, the whole
business is transacted by a public officer, under the guidance and
superintendence of the court itself. Even after the sale is made
it is not final until a report is made to the court and it is approved
and confirmea1. Either party may object to the report, and the
purchaser himself, who becomes a party to the sale, may appear
before the court, and, if any mistake has occurred, may have it
corrected. He therefore becomes a party to the proceeding, and
may represent and defend his own interest, and may be compelled
by process of the court to comply with the terms of the contract:
Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason 420.
6. Subject to those qualifications, and perhaps some others
which need not be noticed, the question of sale or no sale, when it
arises under a state of facts such as are exhibited in this record,
may be fully tested by substantially the same rules as those which
apply in cases of sales under common law process, or in other
cases of sales at public auction. Tested by those rules it is clear
to a demonstration that there was no sale of the mortgaged pre.
mises in this case, because the property was never struck off to
the appellant, nor was his bid, by act, or word, or- in any manner,
ever accepted by the seller, and the record shows that at the hear
ing in the court below nothing of the kind was pretended by the
appellant. Instead of setting up that pretence, his complaint was
that the marshal erred in refusing to accept his bid, which, if possible, is less defensible upon the facts and circumstances of the
case than the theory of the sale and purchase.
7. Officers appointed under such decrees and directed to make
such sales have the power to accomplish the object, but they are
usually invested with a reasonable discretion as to the manner of
its exercise which they are not at liberty to overlook or disregard
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Acting under the decree they have duties to perform to the complainant, to the vendor and purchaser, and to the court, and they
are bound to exercise their best judgment in the performance of all
those duties. Such an officer, in acting under such a decree, if
directed to sell the property, should adopt all necessary and proper
means to fulfil the directions, but he should at the same time never
lose sight of the fact that, unless he is restricted by the terms of
the decree, the time and manner of effecting the sale are, in the
first instance, vested in his sound discretion. The usual practice
undoubtedly is, that the officer in selling the property acts umder
the advice of the solicitor of the complainant, but it cannot be
admitted that his advice is under all circumstances obligatory upon
the officer.
Granting that solicitors may properly advise the officer, still it
must be borne in mind that the authority and discietion in making
the sale are to a certain extent primarily vested in the officer
designated in the decree. Unreasonable directions of the solicitor
are not obligatory and should not be followed, as if the solicitor
should direct the property to be struck off at great sacrifice when
but a single bidder attended the sale. Under such circumstances
the officer might well refuse to do as he was directed, and he
might be justified in postponing the sale'to a future day to prevent
the sacrifice of the property. Every such officer has a right to
exercise a reasonable discretion to adjourn such a sale, and all
that can be required of him is that he should have proper qualifications, use due diligence in ascertaining the circumstances, and
act in good faith and with an honest intention to perform his duty.
The general rule is that a. sheriff is not bbund to obey the directions of the attorney of the creditor to make an unreasonable sale
of the property of the debtor, if he sees that the time selected or
other attending circumstance will be likely to produce great sacrifice of the property, but he may in such a case, if he thinks proper, postpone the sale, especially if it appears that the creditor will
not sustain any considerable injury by the delay; and no reason is
perceived why the same rule may not be safely applied in judicial
sales made under the decretal order of a court of chancery.
8. Courts often say that an auctioneer is solely the agent of the
seller of the goods until the sale is effected, and that then he
becomes also the agent of the purchaser, for certain purposes, but
the marshal or master in carrying out a decretal order is more

